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Abstract 
The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the 
antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, 
which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a 
quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are 
shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its 
probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning 
that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid. 
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1. A Greener Approach to Logic 
When it comes to managing ontic resources, philosophy may be notoriously prodigal. One 
only needs to recall Plato’s world of ideas, Popper’s Third World, or Lewis’ possible worlds. 
But when epistemic and logical resources are in question – the nature and scope of what is 
knowable and the limits of what is acceptable as formally valid – the problem may rather be 
some excessive profligacy. All sorts of radical sceptics, rigorous empiricists and dogmatic 
rationalists seem to be bent on throwing away far too much; they waste what could be 
otherwise saved or recycled, both in terms of what we probably do know and in terms of what 
we might have a decent right to conclude. In this paper, I wish to help to redress this 
situation. I will argue that logic has been guilty of an “ungreen policy”, by considering some 
formal logical fallacies as absolutely worthless rubbish, only fit for the conceptual junkyard, 
thus wasting their potential contribution to our information processes. I will suggest that there 
is a greener and much more reasonable interpretation of such fallacies, which shows that they 
can be rather useful, if quick and dirty, and probably riskier, ways to gain and manage one’s 
information. Some logical fallacies are not mere mistakes of no value but informational 
shortcuts that can be epistemically fruitful if carefully managed. 
 
2. What are logical fallacies? 
There is no ultimate and complete agreement among logicians or philosophers on a very tight 
definition of what a logical fallacy is (Hansen and Pinto [1995]). This is so, partly because 
opponents like to use the expression flexibly, in order to throw dialectical mud at each other, 
and partly because a large variety of errors in reasoning is often diagnosed as a logical 
fallacy. The result is that there is no fixed taxonomy either. However, for the purpose of this 
paper, the following might provide a good starting point: 
LF)  a logical fallacy =def. any (possibly unnoticed) deductively invalid or erroneous 
argument with the appearance of validity or a demonstrably false conclusion from 
plausible reasoning.  
If LF (or a working definition sufficiently similar to it) is acceptable, the next step usually 
consists in distinguishing between two types of LFs (Woods and Walton [1982]): 
ILFs) Informal logical fallacies; and 
FLFs) Formal logical fallacies. 
ILFs are really mistakes in argumentation, such as begging the question, ignoratio elenchi, 
argumentum ad hominem, and so forth. What is wrong with them is something in their 
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semantics or in their strategy, not so much in their essential structure or form. ILFs will make 
a brief appearance later in the paper, but they are not its subject.  
What concerns us here are FLFs. Their problem is entirely morphological. In 
particular, the two best known schemes of FLFs are denying the antecedent (DA) and 
affirming the consequent (AC) (Hamblin [1970]), and in the rest of this paper we shall 
concentrate our attention on them. An old and influential tradition has denounced both as just 
basic and simple errors, weeds in the logical garden, to be eradicated as quickly and 
thoroughly as possible, wherever they occur. Pace Aristotle, this might not be such a good 
idea. 
 
3. Do FLFs provide any information? 
Answers to this question can be grouped under two headings, which are not mutually 
exclusive: 
a) No. Considered as plain and obvious errors, FLFs are normally dismissed as 
providing zero information; 
b) Yes. As errors, FLFs show, metatheoretically, that individuals make systematic 
mistakes and that human reasoning is faulty.  
On (a), there is of course a vast literature in logic and critical thinking, but no significant 
advancement has been made since Aristotle condemned logical fallacies to the dustbin, in his 
De Sophisticis Elenchis (Aristotle [1938]). 
On (b), the literature is equally vast but less unanimous. In cognitive science, 
developmental psychology and neuroscience, a wealth of experiments at least since the 
sixties (e.g. the classic Wason selection task, in Wason [1966]) has shown, allegedly, that 
humans are not so rational, or not as rational as they like to describe themselves. Yet, in this 
context, there is also a rather annoying tendency to over-simplify and reduce a variety of 
ways and styles of rational thinking to problem solving, the latter to logical reasoning and this 
to conditional reasoning. This reduction may be questionable, to say the least, and 
misleading, as semantic and social interpretations of the Wason selection task seem to show 
(Griggs and Cox [1982]). On the whole, however, Stein [1996] still provides a good survey 
and a widely accepted conclusion about (b), so let me quote him at lenght: “According to 
experiments done over the past few decades, humans make [...] significant errors in various 
realms of reasoning: logical reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, similarity judgements, and 
risk-assessments to name a few. Together these [...] reasoning experiments are taken to show 
that humans are irrational. [...] Some philosophers
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and appealing arguments that these experiments are mistaken or misinterpreted because 
humans must be rational (p. 1) [...]. I attempt to show that these arguments fail; cognitive 
science can and should play a role in determining whether or not humans are rational (p. 2)”. 
Stein might be right, but the story is probably a bit less discouraging, as I will try to show 
you.  
 
4. Formal fallacies and their explanations 
Formal logical fallacies are the dark side of valid inferences: denying the antecedent (DA) is 
supposed to be a rotten variant of Modus Ponens (MP), while affirming the consequent (AC) 
may be seen as a Modus Tollens (MT) gone wrong. This can more easily be appreciated 
visually, by looking at Figure 1. 
 
MP DA  MT AC 
φ → ψ 
φ 
________ 
        ψ 
   φ → ψ 
¬ φ 
________ 
         ¬ ψ 
   φ → ψ 
        ¬ ψ 
________ 
¬ φ 
φ → ψ 
        ψ 
________ 
φ 
Figure 1. Valid inference schemes and formal logical fallacies 
 
In a study now classic, Marcus and Rips [1979] presented participants with examples of MP, 
MT, DA and AC, and asked them to judge each argument as either valid or invalid.  Results 
showed that participants often incorrectly judged MT as invalid, and incorrectly judged DA 
and AC as valid. There are two standard, positive explanations about why participants accept 
fallacies as valid inferences (Verschueren et al. [2001]).1 Following a stronger informational 
reading, the first suggests that participants mistake “only if” for “if and only if”, treating “if it 
is a square, then it has four sides” as the same as “if it is water, then it is H2O”. This was 
already Aristotle’s view: “The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because 
people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible. [...] since after rain the ground 
is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining; whereas that 
does not necessarily follow.” (De Sophisticis Elenchis). The other, based on a weaker 
informational reading, holds that participants mistake necessity for probability. The two 
explanations may not be incompatible. To see why, we need to rely on Bayes’ theorem. 
                                                 
1 In the rest of this article I shall not be concerned with the other problem, namely why participants misjudge 
MT as invalid.  
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5. Bayes’ theorem 
Bayes’ theorem calculates the posterior probability of an event A given event B (that is, 
P(A|B) on the basis of the prior probability of A (that is, P(A)). Basically, it tells us what sort 
of information can be “retrodicted” (backward prediction). The well-known formula is: 
 
 
 
 
Let us consider a simple example. Suppose Jill receives many emails, but only a few of them 
(say 2%) are infected by some software virus. She uses a rather reliable antivirus software, 
which is successful 95% of the time. The latter does not erase her potentially infected emails, 
but moves them to a special quarantine folder in the e-mail client software, which Jill can 
check. Jill wonders how often she should check it for good emails. The question she is 
implicitly asking is: “what is the probability that A (= the email was infected), given the fact 
that B (= the email was blocked by the antivirus and placed in the quarantine folder) when, on 
average, 2% of all the emails I receive are actually infected and my antivirus is successful 
95% of the time, that is, it provides only 5% false positives?” If the chance that some emails 
in the quarantine folder might not be infected is very low, then she will check it only 
occasionally, rather than regularly. 
Suppose Jill runs an ideal test on one million emails. The result is shown in Figure 2. 
The chance that an email might be infected before being blocked by the antivirus is 2%, but 
the chance that an email in the quarantine folder is actually infected is roughly 28%. Clearly, 
Jill should check her folder regularly. 
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Figure 2. A simple application of Bayes’ theorem, adapted and reproduced with permission from Shor, 
Mikhael (2005), “Bayes Rule Applet”, Game Theory .net, 
http://www.gametheory.net/Mike/applets/Bayes/Bayes.html.  
 
 
5. Bayes’ theorem and the AC fallacy 
Jill is a smart girl. Maggie, a friend of hers, is not. She uses the same antivirus and receives 
roughly the same number of emails, with approximately the same quantity of infections but, 
when Jill explains to her that she should check her quarantine folder regularly, she is 
astonished. For she thought that, if the email was infected, then the antivirus blocked it, and 
since the quarantine folder contains only emails blocked by the antivirus, then all the emails 
in it must be infected. More formally, she reasoned that: A → B, B ├ A. Jill explains to 
Maggie that the previous inference is a typical fallacy (AC), but that she should not feel silly 
at all. For, consider Bayes’ theorem once again. Look at the formula P(B|Ac), where Ac (the 
absolute complement) is just another notation for ¬ A. P(B|Ac) indicates the probability that 
the antivirus blocks the email (B) when the email is not infected (Ac). Suppose we have 
perfect, infallible antivirus software. This will generate no false positives (no mistakes). But 
if there are no false positives, that is, if P(B|Ac) = 0, then P(A|B
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degraded to a double implication: A ↔ B, B ├ A, which is what Maggie perhaps had in 
mind. On the other hand,  if there are some false positives, that is, if P(B|Ac) > 0, then P(A|B) 
< 1 and the formula bears a strong family resemblance to the AC fallacy: A → B, B ├ A, 
which is what Maggie might also have had in mind. Either way, Maggie was taking a shortcut 
(she disregarded the probabilities) to focus on the sort of information that she could extract 
from the fact that those emails were in the quarantine folder. And on the wise advice of being 
safe rather than sorry, she treated all its content as dangerous. The result is that Maggie is 
ontologically thrifty (she trusts many less items than Jill) by being logically greener (she 
relies on a reasoning that, although formally fallacious, can still be recycled to provide a 
quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from her environment). If this is unclear, 
the reader may try this other example.  
Maggie’s teacher tells her that, if she does not study enough, then she will fail her 
exam. Unfortunately, Maggie does fail her exam and the teacher reproaches her for not 
having studied enough. Maggie has learnt her Bayesian lesson, so she knows that the 
teacher’s reasoning is fallacious. But she also knows that it is fairly accurate, as a shortcut 
that gets things right most of the time: on average, students who fail their exams have not 
studied enough. The teacher should have simply sprinkled her inference and then judgement 
with some “probably” and “most likely” clauses. Basically, the AC fallacy is Bayes’ theorem 
stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer the fallacy is 
to a reasoning that is logically valid.  
 
5. Bayes’ theorem and the AC fallacy 
The case for the DA fallacy is analogous. Given the same interpretations for A, B, Ac and Bc, 
Jill calculates, through Bayes’ theorem, the probability that the email is not blocked by the 
antivirus given the fact that it is not infected, that is, P(Bc|Ac). In this case too, if there are no 
false positives, that is, if P(B|Ac) = 0, then P(Bc|Ac) = 1 and the formula is again degraded to a 
double implication A ↔ B, ¬ A ├ ¬ B, which is perfectly valid. If there are some false 
positives, that is, if P(B|¬A) > 0, then P(Bc|Ac) < 1, and the formula bears a strong family 
resemblance to the DA fallacy: A → B, ¬ A ├ ¬ B. The DA fallacy is also Bayes’ theorem 
stripped of some of its probabilities. We are now ready for an overall interpretation. 
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6. Formal Fallacies and their Bayesian interpretation 
Consider Figure 3. In row 1, all four schemes introduce φ → ψ. If we interpret φ →  ψ 
informationally, it means that there are no false negatives: in our example, if the email is 
infected, the antivirus blocks it. 
 
 MP DA MT AC 
1 φ → ψ  φ → ψ φ → ψ φ → ψ 
 
2 
φ 
________ 
        ψ 
¬ φ 
________ 
         ¬ ψ 
        ¬ ψ 
________ 
¬ φ 
         ψ 
________ 
Φ 
Figure 3. Valid inferences and formal logical fallacies 
 
MP and MT rely only on this information, so there is no need for probabilities. However, DA 
and AC also assume (and here is the logical mistake) that there are no false positives (double 
implication), or that, if there are, they are so improbable as to be disregardable (degraded 
Bayes’ theorem). So DA and AC are Bayesian “quick and dirty” informational shortcuts. 
When we use them, we bet that A → B, B ├ A or that A → B, ¬ A├ ¬ B. The bet might be 
risky (we might be wrong), but it often pays back handsomely in terms of lower amount of 
informational resources needed to reach a conclusion (see the case of the teacher assessing 
whether Maggie studied enough). Moreover, it is easy to show that the information gain 
increases (the bets are less risky) the more the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. soundness: A is true and A → B valid; 
2. relevance: A and B in A → B are relevantly related and not independent: the 
occurrence of A affects the occurrence of B meaningfully (not as in “if Paris is the 
capital of France then bachelors are unmarried”, but more as in “if Paris is the capital 
of France then Lyon is not the capital of France) (Floridi [2008]); 
3. constraints: we assume A1,A2,…,Ak to be mutually exclusive events, whose union is 
the whole sample space of an experiment, and B to be an event with P(B) > 0.  
 
7. Advantages of the Bayesian Interpretation of Formal Logical Fallacies 
The “greener” approach to DA and AC just offered presents several advantages.  
First, and quite interestingly, parallel results have been recently achieved in the 
Bayesian analysis of informal fallacies: “[...] three classic reasoning fallacies [...] 
10 
 
argumentum ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope 
argument [...] match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it 
is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the 
content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This leads to a Bayesian 
reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which 
they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation.” (Hahn and Oaksford [2006], 
p. 207) The convergence is remarkable and probably significant. Humans reason in many 
different ways, only few of which are captured by mathematical logic, as cognitive science is 
increasingly showing (Chater and Oaksford [2008]). 
Second, the Bayesian interpretation is consistent with recent work on the 
interpretation of 
1. abduction as inference to the best explanation (IBE),  
2. the AC fallacy as a form of IBE and  
3. IBE in Bayesian terms.  
It all turns out to be a bit too consistent to be accidental. If we accept the previous Bayesian 
interpretation of DA and AC, the following quote acquires a very interesting meaning: “It has 
become common in AI to identify “abduction” with backward modus ponens [i.e. affirming 
the consequent], or with backward modus ponens together with constraints on the set of 
conclusions that are allowable, or with backward modus ponens with syntactic constraints. 
There is a burden on those who study restricted forms of backward modus ponens to show us 
the virtues of their particular forms – they need to show us how they are smart. I suggest that 
they will find that backward modus ponens is smart to the degree that it approximates, or 
when it is controlled and constrained to approximate, or when it implements, inference to the 
best explanation.” (Josephson [2000], p. 32). In the email example, AC is read as an IBE 
(inference to best explanation or retrodiction) effort: the email was blocked because it was 
(probably) infected; whereas DA is read as an IBP (inference to best prediction) effort: the 
email is not infected so it will (probably) not be blocked.  
Third, formal fallacies are interpreted in terms of information-gathering and gain, 
rather than argumentative and dialectical strength, as in post-Aristotelian logic, or 
mathematical utility, as in post-Fregean logic. To put it less cryptically, AC and DA are still a 
disaster, if our goal is to win an argument, because our opponent will not have to be too smart 
to provide plenty of counterarguments. They are also mathematical calamities, whenever our 
goal is to provide valid proofs that convey total certainty and faultless conclusions, for their 
morphology makes them utterly unreliable. But when it comes to extracting information from 
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whatever is at hand and without too much fuss, they can be serviceable. This point is related 
to the last advantage, which is best left for the conclusion. 
 
8. Conclusion: Rationality Regained 
Anyone who has taught logic to undergraduates knows that logical fallacies are very common 
and hard to eradicate. Convincing normal, intelligent, decently educated, young minds, who 
have successfully negotiated very complex cognitive tasks for almost two decades, that their 
most basic ways of reasoning produce only worthless rubbish takes a while and some effort. 
It is also an unrewarding and tedious task, which is not always successful. A common result 
is the development of a schizophrenic attitude: life is life and logic has got little to do with it. 
Otherwise ut: when in the logic class do as the teacher does, but then, at the pub, you can go 
back to your old habits and infer that if someone has had too many drinks and drives, that 
person will have an accident and since she did have an accident she must have been drunk. A 
greener approach to the way in which we treat fallacies has the advantage of making people 
see not only the limits of similar ways of reasoning, but also their value, provided one is 
aware of the sort of epistemic risks one is running. In a way, AC and DA are very powerful 
tools – inferentially, they are the equivalent of shoot first and ask questions later – developed 
by embedded and embodied agents to cope, as quickly and successfully as possible, with a 
hostile environment. The fact that we have had the leisure, in the past few millennia, to show 
how badly logical fallacies serve us when the inferential game becomes more refined and 
subtle, either dialectically or mathematically, should not prevent us from building a healthier 
relation between life and logic and recognise their potential utility. The sooner we start 
recycling them the better.2 
 
 
                                                 
2 This paper was first presented at the First Workshop on the Philosophy of Information and Logic, University 
of Oxford 3-4 November, 2007. I am indebted to Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson for his kind encouragement and 
his patience with the editorial process and I am very grateful to the participants for the discussion during and 
after the meeting, for it generated several improvements. A second version was the subject of an invited talk at 
the yearly meeting, in Cumberland Lodge, of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Hertfordshire 
(15-17 February 2008). I wish to thank Brendan Larvor for that opportunity and all the attendees for the 
feedback I received on that occasion. The students in my logic class deserve more than a passing 
acknowledgement, for they have been the subjects of several conceptual experiments involving the topics 
covered in this paper, during which I am not sure nobody was mentally harmed. Finally, a special thank to 
Mikhael Shor, for having made the applet available online and for allowing me to use it and reproduce the 
picture in Figure 2, and to Joanna Gilles for copyediting the text. 
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